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NOTE
IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTION:
ADJUSTING TO FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 609
INTRODUCTION
Charles W. Cavender's 1976 arrest on federal weapons
charges' was not his first encounter with the law. His record in-
cluded prior convictions for sodomy in 1951, violation of proba-
tion in 1955, and forgery in 1961.2 Anxious to testify in his own
defense 3 but concerned that the government would then intro-
duce his record to impeach him, 4 Cavender moved to exclude his
prior convictions under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(b). Rule
609(b) prohibits the use of convictions more than ten years old to
impeach a witness "unless the court determines, in the interests of
justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by
specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its preju-
dicial effect." The trial court denied the motion and Cavender
declined the stand.' When the jury found him guilty, 6 Cavender
appealed. Viewing the issue as "the proper application of [rule
609(b)]," the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Cavender, reversed
and remanded for a new trial.7
United States v. Cavender and its Second Circuit counterpart,
United States v. Mahler,8 represent the latest procedural and sub-
stantive refinements of rule 609(b), highlighting anew the con-
troversy over impeachment by prior convictions. The decisions
1 United States v. Cavender, 578 F.2d 528, 529 (4th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 535 & n.1 (concurring opinion).
3 Id. at 529.
" A defendant who does not testify cannot be impeached. Rule 404 allows evidence of
a defendant's prior convictions where relevant to prove what Judge Weinstein calls "a
proper consequential fact" in the case at hand (FED. R. EVID. 404(b); 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 404[08], at 404-42 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
WEINSTEIN]), or where the defendant has put his character in issue. FED. R. EvID. 404(a)(1).
Cavender's prior convictions lacked the requisite relevance to warrant admission under rule
404(b). Nor did Cavender first introduce evidence of his character. Thus, the court's rule
609 determination would affect Cavender's willingness to testify.
5 578 F.2d at 529-30.
6 Id. at 530.
7 Id.
8 579 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1978).
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read the rule to require explicit findings when a court admits re-
mote 9 prior convictions to impeach any witness. By so doing, the
cases indirectly encourage on-the-record findings under rule
609(a)(1), which governs the admissibility of certain recent prior
convictions. Finally, Cavender invites a closer analysis of how rule
609(b)'s balancing test should apply to the criminal defendant.
I
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 609: RESTRICTING
PRIOR CONVICTION IMPEACHMENT
The House-Senate Conference Committee that convened in
late 1974 faced a thankless job: reconciling two widely divergent
approaches to the use of prior convictions for impeachment. 10
The debate over rule 609 was sustained and strident." The
House eliminated impeachment by all prior convictions unless re-
cent and directly related to veracity.' 2 The Senate, on the other
9 In the context of the Federal Rules of Evidence, "remote" prior convictions are those
for which "a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or
of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever
is the later date." FED. R. EVID. 609(b). Those prior convictions that do not yet qualify
under this definition are "recent." Some uncertainty exists concerning how courts should
measure the ten-year period. The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Little, 567 F.2d 346,
350 n.4 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 969 (1978), questioned, but did not resolve,
whether the date of indictment or the date of trial governs the time computation. Because
the evidence must be used only to attack credibility, the ten-year rule should probably run
from the time the witness takes the stand. The Fifth Circuit added a twist to the rule,
holding that a "defendant's voluntary flight tolled the ten-year limitation" because "[bly his
voluntary wrongful act, he cannot gain the protection of Rule 609(b)." United States v.
Mullins, 562 F.2d 999, 1000 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 906 (1978).
10 Weinstein observes that prior-conviction impeachment
involves two, sometimes conflicting, ends of the criminal law-safeguarding the
innocent and punishing the guilty. Permitting unlimited use of defendant's
criminal past for impeachment undoubtedly results in more convictions; it also
increases the likelihood that a person will be found guilty who, this time at
least, has not committed a crime. Limiting the use of convictions for impeach-
ment provides more protection for the innocent, but it also raises the spectre of
the guilty out on the streets because the jury has been denied information help-
ful in evaluating the credibility of witnesses.
3 WEINSTEIN, supra note 4, 609[01J, at 609-46 to 609-47.
11 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d. 348, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("Rule 609 was
one of the most hotly contested provisions in the Federal Rules of Evidence"); K. REDDEN
& S. SALTZBURG, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 181 (1975) ("Probably no single
Rule provoked as much controversy as Rule 609"); 3 WEINSTEIN, supra note 4, 609[03a],
at 609-73 ("Congress considered the prior conviction to impeach issue more fully than any
other single rule and the compromise it reached should be respected by the courts."). For a
general discussion of the legislative history, see id. at 609-2 to 609-42.
12 H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REc. 2374 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 650,
93d Cong., 1st Sess., 11-12 (1973), reprinted in (1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7075,
7084-85.
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hand, made all recent veracity-related convictions and felony con-
victions automatically admissible 13 and provided for the limited
admission of remote prior convictions.' 4 The creative com-
promise that emerged had its origins in the District of Columbia
evidence law, the only previous congressional expression on
prior-conviction impeachment.
The District of Columbia statute had stated that a witness'
prior conviction "may be given in evidence to affect [his] cred-
ibility." 15 This straightforward rule paralleled the law of most
jurisdictions, where evidence of recent prior convictions was freely
admissible against all witnesses, including defendants in criminal
proceedings.' 6 In 1965, however, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit gave the statute a new reading.' 7  Judge McGowan said in
Luck v. United States 18 that trial courts were "not required to allow
impeachment by prior conviction every time a defendant takes the
stand in his own defense. The statute, in our view, leaves room
for the operation of a sound judicial discretion to play upon the cir-
cumstances as they unfold in a particular case." 19 By 1970, most
federal courts had accepted the Luck discretionary approach.20
The popularity of the Luck doctrine was attributable more to
its sound policy base than to its statutory analysis 21 (which, even if
13 H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 37076 (1974) (as amended by
Senate).
14 S. R P. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 15 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7061-62.
" Act of Dec. 23, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-241, ch. 3, § 14-305, 77 Stat. 519 (current
version at D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305 (1973)).
16 McCoRMIcK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 43, at 89-90 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972). At common law, many prior convictions rendered a person incompetent to testify.
This "primitive absolutism" has yielded to the almost universal practice today of using
prior convictions not to bar testimony, but to impeach credibility. Id. at 84-85.
17 In fact, the court interpreted not the 1963 statute quoted in text accompanying note
15 supra, but its 1961 codification. See Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 767-68 (D.C.
Cir. 1965).
18 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
19 Id. at 768 (first emphasis in original, second emphasis added).
20 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 412 F.2d 753, 756 (lst Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 944 (1970); United States v. Hildreth, 387 F.2d 328, 329 (4th Cir. 1967); 3 WEIN-
STEIN, supra note 4, 609[03], at 609-62 to 609-64, 609-62 n.2.
The Luck doctrine was refined in Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968). Gordon's principal contribution was a detailed
discussion of those factors the court should include in the Luck discretionary consideration.
The factors were: (1) the nature of the prior conviction; (2) its remoteness in time; (3) its
similarity to the crime charged; (4) the need for the defendant's testimony; and (5) the
importance of the credibility issue. Id. at 940-41. See text accompanying notes 89-114 infra.
21 See, e.g., United States v. Palumbo, 401 F.2d 270, 272-73 (2d Cir. 1968).
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valid, did not apply outside the District of Columbia).22 Courts
and commentators have claimed that the prior-conviction im-
peachment device interferes with defendants' fair trial rights by
either discouraging them from taking the stand or unfairly prej-
udicing them when they do.23 By the time the federal rules were
being drafted, reformers both in and out of Congress had asked
for severe limitations, if not an outright ban, on the use of prior
convictions for impeachment.2 4  They viewed Luck as a small step
22 In seeking a statutory basis for judicial discretion, the Luck majority emphasized that
the statute said conviction evidence "may be given in evidence" rather than "shall be given
in evidence." 348 F.2d at 768 (emphasis added). Judge Danaher, however, read the lan-
guage not as authorizing judicial discretion, but simply as indicating that "a party is not
bound ... to impeach a witness." Id. at 771 (concurring in part, dissenting in part).
23 See, e.g., United States v. Wolf, 561 F.2d 1376, 1380 (10th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Puco, 453 F.2d 539, 542 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 844 (1973); Ladd, Credibility
Tests-Current Trends 89 U. PA. L. REv. 166, 178 (1940) ("admission of [prior-conviction
evidence] to test credibility ... would find little support upon psychological theories");
Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 778
(1961) ("questioning whether, on balance, the impeachment value of any other crimes evi-
dence is worth the risk of prejudice it creates") (emphasis in original).
Some critics have raised constitutional objections to prior-conviction impeachment
based on the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the sixth amendment
right to trial by an impartial jury, and due process and equal protection. See, e.g., Note,
Constitutional Problems Inherent in the Admissibility of Prior Record Conviction Evidence for the
Purpose of Impeaching the Credibility of the Defendant Witness, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 168 (1968).
These claims have largely been unsuccessful in the courts. See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385
U.S. 554, 561 (1967) ("the conceded possibility of prejudice is believed to be outweighed by
the validity of the State's purpose in permitting introduction") (dictum); United States v.
Bailey, 426 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("the Spencer decision ... is a barrier against a
decision by us that [prior conviction impeachment] ... is violative of appelants' [sic] con-
stitutional rights"). The D.C. Circuit upheld the constitutionality of this provision even
after D.C. law removed judicial discretion and mandated admission of prior-conviction evi-
dence. See United States v. Belt, 514 F.2d 837, 849-50 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The Supreme
Court, however, has ruled unconstitutional the use of invalid prior convictions to impeach a
defendant. Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 483 (1972).
One Congressman, explaining his efforts to limit the prior-conviction impeachment
device, stated that
most of the research on the subject indicates that a very large proportion of the
miscarriages ofjustice which occur are in those cases where either we prejudice
the man because he does take the witness stand in his own defense, or we scare
him off and he does not tell his story because of that rule.
120 CONG. REc. 1419 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dennis).
24 Both the Uniform Rules of Evidence and the Model Code of Evidence adopted pro-
visions that prohibited prior-conviction impeachment of the accused unless the accused
first introduced evidence "supporting his credibility." These provisions also permitted
prior-conviction impeachment of any other witness only when the crime involved "dishon-
esty or false statement." UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 21 (superseded 1974); MODEL CODE
OF EvIDENCE rule 106 (1942). Commentators joined the effort to limit prior-conviction im-
peachment. See, e.g., Note, Procedural Protections of the Criminal Defendant -A Reevaluation of
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Rule Excluding Evidence of Propensity to Commit
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:416
in that direction.2 5
Those who opposed the reformers argued that unrestricted
prior-conviction impeachment was vital to the judicial quest for
truth. 26  They denounced the Luck doctrine as a dangerous
change in the statute.27 In 1970, Congress rewrote the District of
Columbia law, rejecting Luck. 28  The new statute eliminated judi-
cial discretion and, at the same time, restricted the use of prior-
conviction evidence. All recent felonies and any recent mis-
demeanors "involv[ing] dishonesty or false statement" were now
automatically admissible; convictions older than ten years, how-
ever, were completely inadmissible. This congressional skirmish
over prior-conviction impeachment foreshadowed the larger battle
ahead.
After years of effort by its Advisory Committee, the Supreme
Court in 1972 sent to Congress the proposed Federal Rules of
Crime, 78 HARV. L. REV. 426, 450 (1964) (impeachment should be limited to veracity-
related evidence or, preferably, excluded altogether); Note, Impeachment of the Defendant-
Witness by Prior Convictions, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 277, 286 (1968) (suggesting outright ban).
Congressional reform proposals were generally less drastic. See Rules of Evidence: Hearings
Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 251 (1973) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings] (impeach-
ment should be limited to "offenses that have some logical bearing on credibility, such as
perjury") (statement of Rep. Dennis). For a detailed discussion of the congressional reform
efforts, see text accompanying notes 31-49 infra.
2' See, e.g., Spector, Impeaching the Defendant by His Prior Convictions and the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence: A Half Step Forward and Three Steps Backward, 1 Loy. CHi. L.J. 247,
262 (1970).
26 In its notes to the first draft of rule 609, the Advisory Committee summarized this
view: "A demonstrated instance of willingness to engage in conduct in disregard of ac-
cepted patterns is translatable into willingness to give false testimony." Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46
F.R.D. 161, 297 (1969). This statement was quoted in the House debate against adoption of
a rule that would limit prior-conviction impeachment to crimenfalsi convictions. 120 CONG.
REc. 1414 (1974) (remarks of Rep.. Hogan).
27 See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 24, at 231 (statement of Rep. Hogan).
28 [F]or the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the
witness has been convicted of a criminal offense shall be admitted ... but only
if the criminal offense (A) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year under the law under which he was convicted, or (B) involved dis-
honesty or false statement (regardless of punishment)....
... In addition, no evidence of any conviction of a witness is admissible
under this section if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the later
of (i) the date of the release of the witness from confinement imposed for his
most recent conviction of any criminal offense, or (ii) the expiration of the
period of his parole, probation, or sentence granted or imposed with respect to
his most recent conviction of any criminal offense.
Act of July 29, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 133, 84 Stat. 550 (1970) (current version at
D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305 (1973)).
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Evidence.2 9 Given Congress' clear rejection of Luck for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, it would have been impolitic for the Court to
suggest its revival. 30  Rule 609, as Congress received it, was mod-
eled after the new District of Columbia law. Like that law, it
painted in black and white, granting no discretion to trial courts.
This inflexibility invited amendment, and the rule began an in-
triguing metamorphosis.
The reformers conceded the admissibility of certain recent
prior convictions, such as perjury or fraud, directly related to the
veracity of the witness (crimen falsi).31 They mounted a strong
attack, however, against the admissibility of felony convictions not
directly related to veracity. The reformers amended this aspect of
the rule repeatedly, taking three basic approaches to the admissi-
bility of recent non-crimenfalsi impeachment evidence: (1) a Luck-
type discretion empowering the court to exclude where "the
danger of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value"; 32 (2)
automatic exclusion as to the accused, with judicial discretion as to
nonaccused witnesses; 33 and (3) automatic exclusion as to all wit-
nesses. 34  The reformers' sentiments dominated the House of
Representatives, which decided that evidence of non-crimen falsi
29 Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972).
S0 Earlier, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure had suggested a
reform measure which partially resurrected Luck discretion by allowing a judge to exclude
a recent conviction if he found "that the probative value of the evidence of the crime is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Proposed Fed. R. Evid.
609(a)(3), 51 F.R.D. 315, 391 (1971). The Committee's efforts earned a sharp rebuke from
Senator McClellan, who concluded that "[a]pparently, the committee paid no attention to
the Congressional judgment on this matter." 117 CONG. REC. 29895 (1971).
31 Even the House Judiciary Committee, which authored the most reform-minded
amendment, concentrated exclusively on non-crimenfalsi: "cross-examination by evidence of
prior conviction should be limited to those kinds of convictions bearing directly on credibil-
ity, i.e., crimes involving dishonesty or false statement." H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 11 (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7075, 7085.
The definition of crimenfalsi has itself been the source of considerable discussion. The
category of crimes subsumed under this term has expanded since its origins in Roman law,
where it referred primarily to documentary fraud. See United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d
348, 362 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1976). For Congress' definition of the phrase "dishonesty and
false statement," which includes the term "crimenfalsi," see note 44 infra. ,
32 H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7075, 7084 (House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice proposal).
33 S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7051, 7061 (Senate Judiciary Committee proposal).
34 H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7075, 7084; 120 CONG. REC. 2374, 2375-81, 2394 (1974) (House
Judiciary Committee and full House of Representatives proposal).
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convictions should be automatically excluded as to all witnesses. 35
The Senate took the opposite tack, however, and adopted the ap-
proach of the Supreme Court's proposed rule, requiring that re-
cent non-crimen falsi convictions be automatically admitted.36
The conference committee fashioned a masterful com-
promise. 37  Rule 609(a)(1) renders recent non-crimen falsi
felonies38 admissible only where "the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudi-
cial effect to the defendant." 39 This language is generally read to
shift the burden on the admissibility question from the accused,
where it resided under Luck,4" to the government. 4I This al-
35 Id.
'6 See note 13 supra.
'7 The conference version was adopted as FED. R. EVID. 609, quoted in part in text
accompanying note 49 infra. See H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1974),
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7098, 7102-03.
38 Although rule 609(a) never uses the words "misdemeanor" or "felony," it distin-
guishes between crimes that are "punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one
year" and those that are not. This language parallels the definitions of "felony" and "mis-
demeanor" contained in 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). States may differ in their characterizations of
crimes, but this Note uses these terms as convenient shorthand.
39 FED. R. EviD. 609(a)(1).
o See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (under Luck, burden
on accused to show that prejudice "far outweighs" probative value), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1029 (1968).
41 See United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 828 (2d Cir.) ("Unlike the rule that pre-
vailed before Rule 609 ... the Government has the burden of showing that probative value
outweighs prejudice."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867 (1977); United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d
348, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("Rule 609(a)(1) ... manifests an intent to shift the burden of
persuasion with respect to admission of prior conviction evidence for impeachment."). The
legislative history gives clear support to this view. See 120 CONG. REC. 40894 (1974) ("the
burden is on the government, which is an important change in the law.") (remarks of Rep.
Dennis).
The Luck discretion to exclude evidence of prior convictions was simply a special appli-
cation of the general rule that judges may exclude unfairly prejudicial evidence, even if
relevant. Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 768 & n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (prior-conviction
balancing test "a standard which trial judges apply every day in other contexts; and we
think it has both utility and applicability in this field"). This principle is embodied in Fed-
eral Rule 403, allowing for the exclusion of relevant evidence on the grounds of prejudice,
confusion, or waste of time: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVWD. 403. Under this scheme, courts would
admit prior-conviction evidence absent a showing that "its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Rule 609 reverses this process. Under rule
609(a)(1), the judge must now exclude prior-conviction evidence unless the government
demonstrates that it possesses sufficient probative value.
Some courts have been slow to adjust to the new language. Ironically, Cavender itself
provides two examples of linguistic confusion on this point. The concurring opinion
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location significantly limits the prior-conviction impeachment of
defendants. 42  Rule 609(a)(1) does not protect nondefendant
witnesses; their convictions are automatically admissible unless
prejudicial to the defendant.43 The compromise wording leaves
unscathed the automatic admissibility of recent crimenfalsi.44
The reformers lost one important battle. Rule 609(b) of the
House version contained an automatic exclusion of convictions
exhibits a lack of sensitivity to the burden-shifting issue, characterizing an earlier version of
rule 609 as "essentially the same wording ... with emphasis perhaps slightly changed" (578
F.2d at 536 (Widener, J.)) when, in fact, the burden was reversed. The majority's error is
potentially worse. Judge Russell stated that "[u]nder 609(a)(1), the felony conviction is ad-
missible unless the District Court finds its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value" (id.
at 532 n.9 (emphasis in original)) when, in fact, a prior conviction is inadmissible unless the
court finds that its "probative value ... outweighs its prejudicial effect." FED. R. EvlD. 609(a)(1)
(emphasis added). Despite the majority's imprecise use of language, it recognized that "the
burden ... is imposed on the Government." 578 F.2d at 530.
42 See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 581 F.2d 973, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("rule 609 was
intended, at least as far as convictions not involving crimenfalsi are concerned, to afford the
criminal defendant some additional protection"). Stewart's reference to "criminal defend-
ant" is too narow; rule 609 applies to civil as well as criminal actions. FED. R. EVID.
1101(b). For a discussion of the problems that rule 609 raises in civil actions, see Savikas,
New Concepts in Impeachment: Rule 609(a), Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 CHI. B. REc. 76
(1975). This Note treats the rule only in its criminal setting, and therefore uses "defend-
ant" and "the accused" interchangeably.
43 Rule 609(a)(1) directs the balancing court to examine the "prejudicial effect to the
defendant" (emphasis added). Section (b) speaks only of "prejudicial effect," without limiting
the court's focus to the accused. Under rule 609(a)(1), recent non-crimenfalsi convictions
are automatically admissible to impeach prosecution witnesses, because such convictions
cannot prejudice defendants. The D.C. Circuit explained:
The addition of the phrase "to the defendant" at the end of Rule 609(a)(1)
reflects a deliberate choice to regulate impeachment by prior conviction only
where the defendant's interests might be damaged by admission of evidence of
past crimes, and not where the prosecution might suffer, or where a non-
defendant witness complains of possible loss of reputation in the community.
United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (emphasis in original) (footnote
omitted).
44 FED. R. EviD. 609(a)(2). The conference committee defined the class of convictions
admissible under rule 609(a)(2):
By the phrase "dishonesty and [sic] false statement" the Conference means
crimes such as perjury or subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal fraud,
embezzlement, or false pretense, or any other offense in the nature of crimen
falsi, the commission of which involves some element of deceit, untruthfulness,
or falsification bearing on the accused's propensity to testify truthfully.
H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7098, 7103. Despite this definition, courts have had difficulty categorizing some
crimes. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir. 1977) (importing
cocaine "a crime in the uncertain middle category-neither clearly covered nor clearly
excluded by [dishonesty or false statement]"). Compare United States v. Ortega, 561 F.2d
803, 805-06 (9th Cir. 1977) (shoplifting misdemeanor not crime involving "dishonesty or
false statement") with United States v. Carden, 529 F.2d 443, 446 (5th Cir.) (petty larcency
involves dishonesty), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 848 (1976).
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more than ten years old.4 5 The Senate, however, perceived a
need to admit remote convictions under special circumstances.4 6
The conference committee accepted the Senate version. 47  Con-
gress approved the conference wording of rule 609, and on July
1, 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence became law.4 8 Federal
Rule of Evidence 609, as adopted, reads in pertinent part:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibil-
ity of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime
shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public
record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year
under the law under which he was convicted, and the court
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved
dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is
not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed
since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness
from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is
the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of
justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by
specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prej-
udicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than 10
years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the
proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written
notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evi-
dence. 49
45 H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. R~c. 2374 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 650,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7075,
7084.
46 S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& At). NEws 7051, 7061 ("Although convictions over ten years old generally do not have
much probative value, there may be exceptional circumstances under which the conviction
substantially bears on the credibility of the witness.").
47 H.R. RPP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7098, 7103. The conference committee did add a notice requirement,
anticipating "that a written notice, in order to give the adversary a fair opportunity to
contest the use of the evidence, will ordinarily include such information as the date of the
conviction, the jurisdiction, and the offense or statute involved." Id.
48 Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926.
49 The following chart illustrates the operation of rule 609(a) and (b):
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II
PROCEDURAL IMPACT: ON-THE-RECORD FINDINGS
A. On-the-Record Findings Under Rule 609(b): Fairness and Judicial
Accountability
The procedural holdings of United States v. Cavender 50 and
United States v. Mahler 51 are straightforward and virtually identi-
cal: under rule 609(b) the trial court must support its admission
of remote prior convictions with on-the-record findings. The
Fourth and Second Circuits draw ample support from the rule's
language, legislative history, and underlying policy considerations.
When the lower court denied Cavender's rule 1609(b) motions,
it gave no hint of its reasoning.52 Judge Russell, writing for a
majority of the panel, reversed because he was "convinced that
[rule 609(b)] did envision [an] 'explicit proceeding with full find-
Conviction Ten Years Conviction More Than
Old or Less Ten Years Old
Crimen Falsi Automatically Balance (609(b))
Admissible
Non-Crimen Falsi Automatically Balance (609(b))
Felony (impeaching Admissible
prosecution witness)
Non-Crimen Falsi Balance (609(a)(1)) Balance (609(b))
Felony (impeaching
defense witness)
Non-Crimen Falsi Inadmissible Inadmissible
Misdemeanor
Not all commentators welcome rule 609's schematization. Professor Irving Younger
calls the rule "a mockery of the form one expects of a statutory rule of evidence" and
condemns "complexity so impenetrable as this." He "dare[s] to hope that Congress will
some day amend Rule 609 along these lines: Any witness may be impeached with convic-
tions, subject to the judge's discretion under Rule 403." Younger, Three Essays on Character
and Credibility Unler the Federal Rules of Evidence, 5 HoFSTRA L. REV. 7, 11-12 (1976) (foot-
notes omitted). Judge Friendly, testifying before the House Subcommittee, probably spoke
for many trial judges when he stated: "I would rather have [the admission of prior convic-
tions] developed on a case by case basis rather than lay down any arbitrary rules." House
Hearings, supra note 24, at 251.
50 578 F.2d 528, 532 (4th Cir. 1978).
51 579 F.2d 730, 734 (2d Cir. 1978).
52 According to the majority, "the District Court made no express finding...; it simply
denied the motions. ... without any real argument on the impeachment value of the sev-
eral crimes." 578 F.2d 528, 531 (4th Cir. 1978). Judge Widener's concurring opinion con-
tests this assessment: "[Tlhe district judge heard the defense attorney on more than one
occasion on this matter, and it was argued at least at length." Id. at 538.
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ings' ... as a basis for the District Court's exercise of discre-
tion." a53 Judge Russell called rule 609(b) "plain and unambigu-
ous." 54 and pointed out that it "requir[es] a finding based on
'specific facts and circumstances."'55 Courts, he said, should
read "specific" as "articulated." 56  Judge Widener, concurring,
would require explicit findings only "if requested," 57 as. they were
by Cavender's attorney. 58
In Mahler, a trial court had refused to exclude prior convic-
tions, relying solely on another judge's denial of the defendant's
same motion at an earlier trial. The trial court had failed to notice
that, in the interim, the convictions had aged beyond ten years
and were subject to rule 609(b). Judge Qakes of the Second Cir-
cuit ruled that the lower court erred because "the language of the
Rule clearly suggests ... an on-the-record determination."...
'supported by specific facts and circumstances.'" 59 If this lan-
guage does not require "carefully spelled out" findings, he said,
then it is "mere surplusage, totally devoid of meaning." 60
Both courts found even stronger support for their holdings
in the rule's legislative history. According to Cavender, judicial dis-
cretion under rule 609(b) is "narrow and limited." 61 To support
this contention, both decisions rely on the Senate Report, which
predicted that courts would admit remote convictions
very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances. The rules
provide that the decision be supported by specific facts and cir-
cumstances thus requiring the court to make specific findings on the
record as to the particular facts and circumstances it has consid-
ered in determining that the probative value of the conviction
substantially outweighs its prejudicial impact.62
43 Id. at 533 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Cohen, 544 F.2d 781, 786
(5th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977), discussed in notes 67-73 and accom-
panying text infra).
$4 578 F.2d at 531.
z5 Id.
26 Id. at 530.
57 Id. at 538 n. 5.
58 Id. at 538.
59 579 F.2d at 734.
60 Id. Unlike Cavender, however, the Mahler court found the error harmless, because the
prior conviction had been "properly introduced for a different purpose." Id. at 736. The
court had admitted the prior convictions "under Rule 404(b), for the limited purpose of
proving knowledge and intent." Id. at 733-34.
61 578 F.2d at 532.
62 S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 7051, 7062 (emphasis added), cited in United States v. Mahler, 579 F.2d 730,
735 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Cavender, 578 F.2d 528, 530 & n.3, 532 (4th Cir.
1978).
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The need for rule 609(b) findings, as perceived by the Caven-
der court, stems from the desirability of effective judicial review.
Without specific findings supporting the trial court's decision,
''appellate review ... would be a 'meaningless gesture.'" 63 The
Mahler court noted this consideration, 64 but also stressed the pol-
icy of fairness to the defendant. 65  In requiring support from
"specific facts and circumstances," Congress guaranteed that trial
courts would consider relevant facts and be fully accountable on
appeal. 66
The case law reveals a gradual acceptance of rule 609(b)'s re-
quirement of on-the-record findings. The first appellate decision
to confront the issue directly was United States v. Cohen.6 7  Thir-
teen years before his trial for tax fraud, Cohen had finished serv-
ing approximately one year for mail fraud.6 8  Noting the nature
of the prior crime, its similarity to the later crime, and that all
relevant events occurred within ten years of Cohen's release from
confinement for the earlier conviction,69 the district judge ruled
that he would admit the prior-conviction evidence if the defend-
ant testified.7 0
The judge neither explicitly examined the possibility of
prejudice to the defendant, nor applied the language of rule
609(b) .7 Recognizing this, the Fifth Circuit conceded that "Rule
609(b) may envision a more explicit proceeding with full findings
setting forth the quality and nature of any possible prejudice to
the defendant." 72 Nevertheless, the court let the conviction
i3 578 F.2d at 532.
64 579 F.2d at 736.
65 "The House believed that convictions more than ten years old have very little or no
probative value.... Yet the risk of convicting a defendant for his past transgressions al-
ways exists; consequently they should be used only 'very rarely and ... in exceptional
circumstances."' Id. The Advisory Committee's Note to proposed rule 609(b) supports this
view: "practical considerations of fairness and relevancy demand that some [time] bound-
ary be recognized." Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D.
183, 271 (1972), reprinted in FED. R. EvID. 609 note (1972) (Advisory Committee).
66 The difficulty some courts have had in applying rule 609(b) demonstrates the need
for caution. See, e.g., United States v. Little, 567 F.2d 346, 350 & n.4 (8th Cir. 1977)
(affirming admission of remote prior conviction but omitting "substantially" from rule
609(b)'s "substantially outweighed" test), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 969 (1978); United States v.
Johnston, 543 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1976) (approving broad use of remote prior conviction to
impeach defendant-witness but citing pre-rule 609 authority).
67 544 F.2d 781 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
68 Id. at 782-85.
69 Id. at 785.
70 Id. at 784-85.
71 Id. at 785.
72 Id. at 785-86.
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stand, pointing out that "[s]ufficient evidence in the record indi-
cates that the trial judge made a thorough and thoughtful analysis
of the issue and based his conclusion upon various factors which
were then before him." 73 It was but a short step from Cohen to
Cavender and Mahler.
Judicial reluctance to accept rule 609(b)'s procedural restric-
tions is understandable. Mandatory on-the-record findings in-
crease a trial judge's burdens while tightening the reins on his
discretionary authority. But as Cavender and Mahler demonstrate,
the rule's clear command and its compelling policies offer the judge
no alternative.
B. On-the-Record Findings Under Rule 6 09 (a): Protecting the Defendant
Rule 609(a)(1) permits the admission of the defendant's re-
cent felony conviction not involving "dishonesty or false state-
ment" only if its "probative value ... outweighs its prejudicial ef-
fect." Unlike rule 609(b), illuminated in Cavender and Mahler, rule
609(a)(1)'s language and history do not support a requirement of
findings. Rule 609(b)'s command that determinations be "sup-
ported by specific facts and circumstances" is conspicuously absent
from rule 609(a)(1). The legislative history calling for findings
under rule 609(b) is keyed to this command; 74 Congress never
intimated a similar requirement under the differently phrased
rule 609(a)(1).
Although they have not required trial courts to make explicit
findings under rule 609(a)(1), appellate courts do not like to be
left entirely in the dark. Even in the days of Luck, trial courts
were advised to put findings on the record. 75 Rule 609(a)(1), as a
descendant of Luck, may have inherited Luck's legacy.76  For
example, in United States v. Mahone,77 the Seventh Circuit reviewed
a rule 609(a)(1) determination which lacked specific findings. Al-
though the trial judge's ruling indicated implicitly that "he
73 Id. at 785.
74 See notes 61-66 and accompanying text supra.
75 In Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1029 (1968), then-Circuit Judge Burger commented that "Luck ... contemplated an on-
the-record consideration by the trial judge."
76 See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 405 F. Supp. 938, 941-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) ("[i]n its
present form, Rule 609(a) codifies a trend of federal cases epitomized by Luck").
7 537 F.2d 922 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1025 (1976).
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weighed the prejudicial effect against the probative value of the
evidence," 78 the court urged trial judges "[i]n the future ... to
explicitly find that the prejudicial effect ... will be outweighed by
its probative value." 7 9 United States v. Smith 80 cites Mahone's ad-
vice with approval and adds its own: "it must be obvious to any
careful trial judge that an explicit finding in the terms of the Rule
can be of great utility, if indeed not required, on appellate review
... and some indication of the reasons for the finding can be very
helpful." 81
Ample policies support Smith's dictum. A mandate of discre-
tion imbues a trial judge not only with authority, but also with
responsibility. By forcing the trial judge to follow the evidentiary
formula, and by allowing the appellate court to review the basis
for his ultimate determination, findings help ensure that the
judge wields his power fairly.82
78 Id. at 929.
79 Id. (emphasis added). On its face, the Mahone dictum merely advises trial courts to
state baldly that the probative value of an admitted conviction outweighs its prejudicial
effect. Such simplicity arguably encourages a trial court to apply rule 609(a)(1) properly
without burdening the court with detailing its reasons. The Cavender court, however, inter-
preted Mahone as advocating explication of the facts and circumstances supporting the trial
court's determination. 578 F.2d at 532 n.11. If Cavender is correct, the dicta of Mahone and
of United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976), discussed in text accompanying
notes 80-81 infra, parallel each other. This Note uses the term "findings" to include state-
ments of specific facts and circumstances, not mere conclusions.
80 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
81 Id. at 357 n.17. Other cases offer similar encouragement. See, e.g., United States v.
Stewart, 581 F.2d 973, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("Where the trial court has failed to address
the balancing test required by Rule 609, reversal may be proper."); United States v. Lamb,
575 F.2d 1310, 1314 (10th Cir. 1978) (no abuse of discretion where "record demonstrates
that the court carefully weighed" probative value and prejudicial impact); United States v.
Seamster, 568 F.2d 188, 191 n.3 (10th Cir. 1978) (quoting with approval Mahone); United
States v. Oakes, 565 F.2d 170, 173 n.12 (1st Cir. 1977) ("the district court's explicit state-
ments in the record revealing its knowledge of Rule 609(a) and the basis for its resolution
of the balancing required by it are most helpful to this court in carrying out our review");
United States v. Hawley, 554 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1977) (trial judge apparently aware of
balancing factors although he did not make "specific statement"); United States v. Hayes,
553 F.2d 824, 828 (2d Cir.) ("court below was not as explicit as it could have been in
identifying and weighing the relevant indicia of probative value and prejudice"), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 867 (1977).
82 FED. R. EVID. 403 contains a similarly constructed test for the exclusion of relevant
evidence on the grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. In United States v.
Dwyer, 539 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1976), the Second Circuit stated that "[t]he trial judge's
refusal, despite repeated requests, to put his reasons for exclusion on the record substan-
tially impairs our ability to ascertain the source of the 'prejudice' to which he referred in
his ruling. Although Rule 403 has placed great discretion in the trial judge, discretion does
not mean immunity from accountability." Id. at 928. See l WEINSTEIN, supra note 4,
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Accountability is important to the protection of defendants'
rights under rule 609(a)(1)'s grant of discretion. Many non-crimen
falsi felonies, such as rape and murder, have tremendous potential
for prejudicing juries and only limited probative worth on credi-
bility. Concededly, rule 609 embodies Congress' determination
that probative value is affected more by remoteness than by the
type of crime. 83 All remote convictions, even crimen falsi, face a
stiffer test under section (b)84 than recent non-crimen falsi face
under section (a). And only section (b) requires explicit find-
ings. 5 However, the general assumption underlying this
dichotomy falters near the extremes. For example, an eleven-
year-old tax fraud conviction is probably more probative and less
prejudicial than a nine-year-old sodomy conviction. Rule 609 al-
lows a judge to 'admit the latter, under section (a)'s easier balanc-
ing test, without explicit findings. Nevertheless, because all non-
crimen falsi felonies are questionable impeachment tools, trial
courts should routinely go beyond the minimum required of them
and provide on-the-record findings when admitting rule 609(a)(1)
evidence.
Finally, appellate decisions informed by explicit findings
create more meaningful precedent than those that must speculate
401[01], 401[08], 403[02], at 401-8.1, 401-29 to 401-30, 403-14 to 403-15. See generally
Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYR. L. REv. 635,
665-66 (1971).
83 The Senate Report summed up congressional opinion on remote convictions: "con-
victions over ten years old generally do not have much probative value." S. REP. No. 1277,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7051,
7061. There was no serious opposition to this view. In contrast, a proposal for exclusion of
non-crimenfalsi convictions met strong resistance. One Congressman stated:
[N]o one can object to permitting a witness to be held up to a jury as unworthy
of belief because he or she had been convicted for cheating or stealing, but that
surely does not exhaust the subject matter. How credible is a witness who has
been convicted, let us say, for kidnapping, or for espionage, or for inciting civil
disorders, or for aircraft piracy, or for assassination, or for any of a number of
other crimes .... Are we really that suspect of acts of dishonesty while willing
to keep from juries the information, for example, that a witness had been con-
victed for making explosive or incendiary devices with the intent to detonate
them in public buildings. Personally I am more concerned about the moral
worth of individuals capable of engaging in such outrageous acts as adversely
reflecting on a witness' character than I am of thieves, and that comparison
justifies my amendment.
120 CONG. REc. 2376 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Hogan), quoted in 3 WEINSTEIN, supra note 4,
at 609-20.
84 Tb be admitted under rule 609(a)(1), a prior conviction's probative value must out-
weigh its prejudicial effect. The probative value of evidence admitted under rule 609(b)
must substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect.
85 See notes 53-74 and accompanying text supra.
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on the lower court's rationale. Whether the appellate court af-
firms or reverses, its analysis of explicit findings provides detailed
guidance for future trial decisions, reducing the uncertainty inher-
ent in any balancing test. Findings thus promote consistency
within each jurisdiction and, to a lesser extent, among jurisdic-
tions. Furthermore, explicit findings under rule 609(a)(1) will en-
courage harmonious construction with the rule 609(b) companion
provision. The rule 609(b) balancing test, although differently
weighted, requires examination of precisely the same factors indi-
cating probative value and prejudicial effect.8 6  Since no other
federal rule requires consideration of these factors, application of
each of these provisions relies heavily on the precedent of the
other.
Thus, on-the-record findings, although not required by rule
609(a)(1), are essential for judicial accountability and certainty in
the law. In light of the high stakes involved in prior-conviction
impeachment of defendants,8 7 courts should err on the side of
caution and place specific findings on the record when admitting
evidence of recent non-crimen falsi felonies. 88
III
SUBSTANTIVE IMPACT: THE CALCULUS OF
THE NEW BALANCING TEST
The majority opinion in Cavender contains an intriguing
alternative holding: even if the lower court were innocent of pro-
cedural sins, it committed a "manifest abuse of discretion" in ad-
mitting Cavender's twenty-five-year-old sodomy conviction. 89  In
his concurring opinion, Judge Widener called this conclusion
86 For a list of these factors, see note 20 supra.
87 One court described the "stakes" well.
[T]he Rule necessarily embodies both the policy of encouraging defendants to
testify by protecting them against unfair prejudice and the policy of protecting
the government's case against unfair misrepresentation of an accused's non-
criminality. It is incumbent upon the courts, in administering Rule 609(a), to
reconcile these competing goals to the extent possible.
United States v. Jackson, 405 F. Supp. 938, 942 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
88 3 WEINSTEIN, supra note 4, 609[03a], at 609-79. For an excellent example of on-
the-record findings, see United States v. Brewer, 451 F. Supp. 50, 53-54 (E.D. Tenn.
1978).
89 578 F.2d at 534.
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"overbroad" 90 and questioned the majority's reading of the rule's
legislative history. 91 The majority took the better view, but of-
fered little elaboration.
Rule 609(b) does not specify which factors the court should
weigh in its balancing test, or how much importance it should at-
tach to each.92  The pre-rule case law and the legislative history
help fill this void. The Cavender majority looked primarily to the
case law, relying on Gordon v. United States 93 to show the inad-
missibility of the sodomy conviction. In Gordon, the most articulate
pre-rule opinion addressing the question, then-Circuit Judge
Burger stated that
the legitimate purpose of impeachment ... is . .. not to show
that the accused who takes the stand is a "bad" person but
rather to show background facts which bear directly on whether
jurors ought to believe him .... A "rule of thumb" thus should
be that convictions which rest on dishonest conduct relate to
credibility whereas those of violent or assaultive crimes gener-
ally do not . . .94
The Cavender majority cited Gordon's "rule of thumb" for the
proposition that "the pivotal issue of the probative value of a con-
viction turns largely on a consideration of the nature of the con-
viction itself." 95  On a bare record, said the majority, it would be
"difficult, if not impossible" to find a twenty-five-year-old sodomy
conviction sufficiently probative. 96
Despite Judge Widener's objection that the majority went too
far, 97 the interplay between sections (a) and (b) of rule 609 indi-
90 Id. at 538.
91 Id. at 536-38.
92 See United States v. Oakes, 565 F.2d 170, 172 (1st Cir. 1977) ("[t]he Committee's
explanatory statement sheds little light on the factors a court must balance").
93 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968). Other courts have
looked to the pre-rule case law for balancing factors under both of rule 609's discretionary
tests. See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, 451 F. Supp. 50, 53 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
94 383 F.2d at 940.
95 578 F.2d at 534.
96 Id. Judge Russell extended this view to the probation violation, but without discus-
sion he withheld judgment on the forgery conviction perhaps because he felt that evidence
was veracity-related. Id. at 534 n.21.
9' Id. at 536-39. Judge Widener apparently believed that the majority had adopted a
per se exclusion of remote, and perhaps all, non-crimenfalsi: "[The opinion's] clear import
is to limit the consideration of felonies which may be introduced for impeachment to [cri-
menfalsi] .... Id. at 537. The majority, however, did not rule that the sodomy conviction
was per se inadmissible; it simply refused to affirm the trial court "on a bare record." Id. at
533-34.
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cates that they could properly have gone further. Rule 609(a)'s
basic premise is that convictions involving "dishonesty or false
statement" have more probative value on credibility than do non-
crimenfalsi.96 Rule 609(b) rests on the premise that the probative
value of prior convictions diminishes with the passage of time.99
Where the defendant's prior conviction is a remote non-crimen
falsi-a twenty-five-year-old sodomy conviction, for example-the
policies underlying (a) and (b) combine to make admission dif-
ficult to justify. Although the Cavender majority appeared only to
recognize in these policies a strong presumption against admis-
sibility, a per se exclusion of remote non-crimenfalsi would be jus-
tified.100 Where probative value will rarely, if ever, "substantially
outweigh" prejudicial effect, automatic exclusion is an appropriate
means of promoting certainty, uniformity, and judicial economy,
and preventing capricious determinations by trial judges.
Remote non-crimenfalsi evidence is not the only candidate for
automatic exclusion under rule 609(b). Courts and commentators
agree that prior convictions similar or identical to the crime for
which the accused is charged are abnormally prejudicial. 10' The
98 Congress called this class of prior convictions "peculiarly probative" (H.R. RP. No.
1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7098,
7103) and made them automatically admissible if recent. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2). On the
other hand, Congress made non-crimenfalsi convictions inadmissible unless the proponent
meets the burden of showing that "probative value ... outweighs ... prejudicial effect."
FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
99 See cases cited in note 107 infra.
100 Antitrust law provides analogous support for developing a per se rule under a con-
gressional grant of discretion. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), as
interpreted in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910), prohibits agreements
"unreasonably" restraining trade. The Supreme Court has found whole categories of
agreements to be per se "unreasonable." See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.,
273 U.S. 392 (1927). As the Court explained in United States v. Northern Pacific Ry., 356
U.S. 1 (1958),
This principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints
which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of ev-
eryone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated
and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry
involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large
whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry so often
wholly fruidess when undertaken.
Id. at 4. Because Congress may not have considered the combined force of the policies
behind sections (a) and (b) of rule 609, a per se exclusion of remote non-crimen falsi ap-
pears to do no violence to legislative intent.
101 See, e.g., United States v. Shapiro, 565 F.2d 479, 481 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Harding, 525 F.2d 84, 90 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Brewer, 451 F. Supp. 50, 54
(E.D. Tenn. 1978); Note, supra note 23, 70 YALE LJ. at 773. But cf. United States v. Cohen,
544 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir.) (in case involving similar crimen falsi offenses, defendant's
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Gordon court recommended that similar prior convictions be ad-
mitted "sparingly," even under the liberal admission standards of
Luck.'0 2 This mode of impeachment, the court reasoned, places
upon jurors "inevitable pressure ... to believe that 'if he did it
before he probably did so this time."' ' 10 3 Limiting instructions,
intended to prevent jurors from making such impermissible infer-
ences, are notoriously ineffective in this regard.' 0 4  Courts should
hold that close similarity to the crime charged automatically dis-
qualifies a remote prior conviction under rule 609(b).10 5  Such
per se exclusion would be consistent with congressional intent to
admit a defendant's remote prior conviction only where its proba-
tive value is high and its prejudicial impact is low.10 6
The Cavender facts raise other important balancing issues not
fully addressed by the opinion. Rule 609(b)'s time limit is a con-
gressional expression that after ten years a prior conviction's pre-
judicial impact will normally outweigh its probative value:' 0 7  This
implies that, over time, probative value diminishes more rapidly
"denials of current misconduct might not be as trustworthy as they normally would be").
102 383 F.2d at 940.
103 Id.
104 Judge Learned Hand described a related limiting instruction as "the recommenda-
tion to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but any-
body's else." Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932).
105 An appropriate test of fatal similarity would be whether the prior conviction and the
crime charged are similar enough in the eyes of a reasonable juror to suggest that the
accused has repeated his particular prior criminal conduct. Compare United States v. Sha-
piro, 565 F.2d 479, 481 (7th Cir. 1977) (lower court improperly admitted evidence of
remote prior convictions-bankruptcy fraud and income tax evasion-that were too simi-
lar to crime charged-misapplication of bank funds by check-kiting) with United States v.
Little, 567 F.2d 346, 348-51 (8th Cir. 1977) (affirming admission of remote prior convic-
tion for fraud in sale of oil and gas leases without mentioning similarity to crime
charged -check-kiting); cert denied, U.S. 969 (1978). Although these are difficult cases,
Shapiro's exclusion of the prior-conviction evidence is the better approach. The jury would
quite probably, in both cases, view check-kiting as a repetition of the defendants particular
prior criminal conduct.
106 This per se rule, which would exclude remote, similar convictions, even if crimenfalsi,
may seem inconsistent with rule 609(a)(2), which automatically admits crimen falsi convic-
tions less than ten years old, even if similar. The similarity factor would be dispositive on
one side of the ten year line and irrelevant on the other. This inconsistency, however, is
less an argument against the per se rule than it is a demonstration that rule 609(a)(2) was
drafted too inflexibly.
107 Cf United States v. Shapiro, 565 F.2d 479, 481 (7th Cir. 1977) (probative value of
prior conviction on issue of credibility decreases with passage of time); United States v.
Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 828 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867 (1977); United States
v. Harding, 525 F.2d 84, 89 (7th Cir. 1975) (same). But see United States v. Brown, 409 F.
Supp. 890, 894 (W.D.N.Y. 1976) ("prejudice to a defendant-witness decreases with age at
least as greatly as does its pertinency to credibility").
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than prejudicial impact. It would be unrealistic to assume that this
phenomenon ceases after ten years. Thus, the older the remote
conviction, the less appropriate its admission under rule 609(b)'s
balancing test. The Cavender court, faced with a twenty-five-year-
old conviction, could have ruled on this point alone.' 0 8
Finally, Judge Widener suggested that courts should more
readily admit a remote conviction if it is part of a "string of
felonies." 109 The Cavender majority, however, believed that "each
conviction is to be considered separately." 110 Although rule
609(b) appears to allow consideration of the "string" factor,"'
courts should give it little weight. Judge Widener correctly con-
cluded "that the commission of a string of felonies would more
likely show a tendency to lie than would an isolated incident." 112
He failed to note, however, that a felony string may increase po-
tential prejudice to an equal or greater degree. In addition, where
recent convictions are available for impeachment, the need for the
remote end of a felony string is diminished; the recent convictions
alone may suffice. These considerations, together with rule
609(b)'s strong presumption against admissibility," 3 indicate that
the "string of felonies" factor should not upset the per se rules
this Note proposes." 4
108 This same factor should be weighed under rule 609(a)(1)'s balancing test; courts
should assign more probative value to a two-year-old conviction than to one that is nine
years old. See, e.g. United States v. Dixon, 547 F.2d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir. 1976) (nine-year-
old conviction not excludable under rule 609(a)(I) "unless the remoteness of the conviction
caused its prejudicial effect to the defendants to outweigh its probative value").
109 578 F.2d at 539-40.
110 Id. at 531 n.6.
111 According to Judge Widener, the evolution of rule 609(b) confused the majority. See
generally 578 F.2d at 539-40. An earlier version of the rule compelled the admission of
remote convictions where the witness' most recent conviction was less than ten years old.
Rule 609 automatically admits only those convictions under ten years old. Although the
"string" factor is no longer dispositive, courts may still consider it in rule 609(b)'s balancing
test.
112 578 F.2d at 539.
113 See notes 61-62 and accompanying text supra.
114 Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029
(1968), cited two additional factors to be weighed under the Luck doctrine: the need for
the defendant's testimony and the importance of the credibility issue. See note 20 supra.
These two factors usually negate each other; as the need for the defendant's testimony
becomes more critical, so does the credibility issue. See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, 451
F. Supp. 50, 54 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (these "[f]actors ... seem to counterbalance each other in
this case"). This was true in Cavender, where "t]he Government's case ... was purely cir-
cumstantial .... Only the appellant was in a position to offer any explanation with refer-
ence to those circumstances." 578 F.2d at 534.
Under the approach suggested in this Note, the court could have excluded Caven-
der's 25-year-old sodomy conviction on either of two grounds. The conviction was a remote
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CONCLUSION
Federal Rule of Evidence 609 comnremorates a pitched con-
gressional battle over the use of prior-conviction impeachment
evidence. Rule 609(b), as amplified in United States v. Cavender and
United States v. Mahler, requires trial courts to make explicit find-
ings when admitting remote prior convictions to impeach any wit-
ness. Trial courts admitting recent prior convictions under rule
609(a)(1) are not required to make such findings. Nevertheless,
these courts too should place findings on the record to protect
criminal defendants from the dangers of prejudice inherent in
prior-conviction impeachment. Further, courts should give full ef-
fect to the policies underlying rule 609(b) by establishing per se
rules excluding remote non-crimen falsi convictions and remote
convictions similar to the crime charged.
Bruce P. Garren
non-crimenfalsi, therefore excludable under the first suggested per se rule (see text accom-
panying notes 89-100 supra) and was also well beyond the 10-year limit (see text accompany-
ing notes 107-108 supra).
One of the most interesting applications of the suggested guidelines would have been in
United States v. Mahler, 579 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1978). Mahler's prior convictions of stock
fraud and related perjury were directly related to veracity and, being approximately 10
and 12 years old respectively, were close to the 10-year threshold. See id. at 733 n.11. The
stock fraud was similar to the charged crime of securities, wire, and mail fraud (id. at 731
n.2) and would be excluded under the second per se test. However, the court could have
admitted the perjury conviction and forbidden the prosecution from introducing or discuss-
ing the underlying crime of stock fraud. The Second Circuit did not reach these questions
because the prior convictions were legitimately introduced for another purpose. Id. at 736.
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